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FW de Klerk** 
 
The 2nd of February next year will be the twentieth anniversary of the beginning of 
the transformation process that led to the establishment of our present non-racial 
constitutional democracy.  The previous year when I had addressed the National 
Party caucus after my unexpected election as leader of the party, I stressed the need 
to take a quantum leap to break out of the political and economic dead-end street in 
which we found ourselves.  The overwhelming reaction was "jump FW, jump!". 
 
And so, twenty years ago, we took our calculated leap of faith.  We reasoned that it 
was unlikely that there would ever again be such favourable circumstances for a 
settlement: 
 
 after the fall of the Berlin Wall, global Communism was in headlong 
disarray;   
 the South African Communist Party – which had controlled virtually all the 
seats on the ANC's National Executive Committee during the 1980s – was 
in shell-shocked retreat; 
 after the failure of the 1984–1987 offensive to make South Africa 
ungovernable, the ANC had at last accepted that there would not be a 
revolutionary outcome; 
 all parties accepted that the continuing escalation of conflict would simply 
destroy the economy and any hope of building a united future; and  
 in the September 1989 elections, the white electorate had given the 
National Party a clear mandate for comprehensive reform and negotiations.   
 
Never again would the balance of forces be so favourable for a fair, negotiated 
settlement.  Even so, we did not enter the negotiation process blindly.  
                                       
* Speech at the eighth FW de Klerk lecture, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, on 12 
October 2009. 
** Frederik Willem de Klerk, former State President of the Republic of South Africa. 
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 We had already held informal and extensive exploratory talks with the ANC 
and with Nelson Mandela.  
 We were confident that we would be able to negotiate a constitution that 
would protect the reasonable rights of all South Africans – a constitution 
that would address the concerns of those who had much to lose, as well as 
the aspirations of those who had much to gain. 
 All this was taking place within an evolving global environment in which 
constitutional democracy and free-market principles were triumphant.  The 
reality was that no major economy could afford to ignore the growing 
consensus on these principles.  Those countries – like Zimbabwe, Cuba 
and North Korea that did ignore them – paid an enormous price.   
 There was also acceptance that the need to foster unity amongst our 
diverse population groups would inevitably place constraints on whatever 
new government might emerge from the negotiation process. 
 
The negotiations culminated on 21 December 1993 with the adoption of the Interim 
Constitution1, which provided the basis for South Africa's first universal democratic 
election in April 1994.  It also established the framework for the drafting and adoption 
of a final constitution by the duly elected Parliament sitting as a Constitutional 
Assembly.  Most importantly, the new constitution would have to comply with thirty-
five constitutional principles that had been negotiated into the 1993 Constitution.  
The Constitutional Assembly duly drafted and adopted the final Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 19962 in 1996 and submitted it to the newly established 
Constitutional Court for certification.  Only on 4 February 1997, after the Court was 
fully satisfied that the new Constitution complied in all respects with the thirty-five 
constitutional principles, did the new Constitution come into effect. 
 
                                       
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 200 of 1993 (hereafter 1993 Constitution). 
2 Hereafter the Constitution. 
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Since then the Constitution has in a very real sense been the foundation of our new 
society: 
 
 it articulates the values on which the new South Africa has been founded;  
 it expresses the transformational aspirations for human dignity, equality and 
social justice for which we all should strive;  
 it lists the rights that all our citizens must enjoy; and  
 it provides truly democratic principles for the organisation of the State, 
including an executive responsible to a democratically elected legislature 
and an independent judiciary standing guard over the Constitution, the rule 
of law and the Bill of Rights.3 
 
The Constitution was nevertheless a great historic compromise.  No party achieved 
everything that it wanted – but all parties were able to secure their minimum 
demands.  Some wanted a unitary state; others, a federation; some wanted 
unbridled power to expropriate property; others were deeply concerned about the 
future of their homes and businesses.  Some wanted a single South African identity; 
others insisted on retaining our rich cultural and language diversity.  We were able to 
reach compromises regarding all of these critical issues, many of which were very 
delicately balanced. 
 
So, for South Africa, our Constitution is much more than a handbook on managing 
the mechanisms of democracy or protecting basic human rights.  In the words of the 
preamble, it is enabling us to heal the divisions of the past and to establish a society 
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights. 
 
In short, the Constitution is the indispensable basis of our national unity and our best 
and abiding hope for continued freedom, prosperity and stability.  For all these 
reasons, we dare not allow anyone to undermine or threaten it.  Yet, the Constitution 
is under threat – and I believe that it is under threat on seven different fronts. 
 
                                       
3 Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
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The first threat is the possibility that Parliament might legally amend the 
Constitution.  In terms of Section 74, Parliament may amend any provision of the Bill 
of Rights and the body of the Constitution itself with a two-thirds majority in both the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces and with the support of six 
of the nine provinces.  It is important to note, however, that Parliament may amend 
the founding provisions in Section 1 only with a 75% majority.  In other words, 
Parliament has only a very constrained ability to amend any provision that would 
undermine the basic institutions of democracy;  the supremacy of the law;  and the 
values of non-racialism, human dignity, equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms. 
 
To its credit, the Government has shown little inclination to introduce substantive 
amendments to the Constitution – even though it enjoyed for several years the 
necessary two-thirds majority to do so.  The exceptions are the Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment Bill4 and the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill,5 
which is currently before Parliament.   
 
The Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill, which was introduced at the end of 
2005, would have seriously undermined key aspects of the independence of the 
judiciary.  Fortunately, the Government withdrew the Bill the following year after it 
encountered vehement and resolute opposition from jurists and commentators 
across the political spectrum.   
 
The second exception is the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill, which has 
far-reaching implications for the future autonomy and viability of the municipal 
government.  Under the guise of an initiative to ensure more effective electricity 
distribution, the Bill would in effect give Government at the national level the power 
to intervene in a wide range of municipal functions.  By so doing, it would undermine 
one of the key compromises in the Constitution and would set a precedent that might 
affect the autonomy of provinces as well.  
 
                                       
4  GN 520 in GG 31013 of 8 May 2008. 
5  GN 869 in GG 32311 of 17 June 2009. 
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The second threat comes from the process of legislative erosion.  In this process, 
constitutional rights are progressively whittled away by provisions hidden away in 
ordinary legislation.  So, for example, the Expropriation Bill6 that was presented to 
Parliament last year would have seriously limited the role of courts in determining fair 
compensation for expropriated property.  By so doing it would have eroded 
constitutional rights to fair administrative action and to access to the courts.  
Fortunately, the Bill was withdrawn. 
 
There were similar problems last year with the National Prosecuting Authority 
Amendment Act7 and South African Police Services Amendment Act,8 which 
abolished the Scorpions and established a new unit in the South African Police 
Services to combat serious crime.  Critics believe that the legislation undermined the 
constitutionally guaranteed independence of the National Prosecuting Authority and 
deprived it of its power under the constitution of carrying out "any necessary 
functions incidental to instituting criminal proceedings." 
 
In the same manner, the recently adopted Films and Publications Amendment Act9 
undermines aspects of the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of 
expression.  In the opinion of critics, it deviates from the carefully worded text of the 
Constitution's definition of impermissible communication;  it is unacceptably vague;  it 
creates unequal conditions for media that belong to recognised media organisations 
and those that do not;  and it requires some media to go through the impossible task 
of submitting their material to censors before it is published. 
 
The third threat to the Constitution comes from executive neglect.  In terms of this 
practice, the Executive simply does not bother with elements of the Constitution that 
it does not like.  This is particularly apparent in the manner in which the 
Constitution’s language and cultural provisions have been systematically ignored 
since 1994. 
 
                                       
6  GN 440 in GG 30963 of 11 April 2008. 
7  56 of 2008. 
8  57 of 2008. 
9  3 of 2009. 
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The Constitution spells out the following requirements with regard to language and 
culture: 
 
 It recognises our eleven official languages. 
 It requires the State to take special action to develop our indigenous 
languages. 
 It requires Government at national and provincial levels to use two official 
languages. 
 It states that municipalities must take into account the language 
preferences of residents. 
 It requires national and provincial governments to regulate and monitor 
their use of official languages. 
 It requires that all official languages enjoy parity of esteem and be treated 
equitably. 
 It states that all South Africans have the right to receive education in the 
language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions, 
where such education is reasonably practicable. 
 
Unfortunately, virtually every one of these provisions has been ignored or diluted 
since the adoption of the Constitution, 1996: 
 
 Increasingly, we have a single de facto official language – English. 
 Government is not conducted in two official languages. 
 Our languages do not enjoy parity of esteem – and are not treated 
equitably. 
 Little or nothing has been done to develop our indigenous languages. 
 Afrikaans single-medium schools are under pressure and there is serious 
concern regarding the preservation of Afrikaans as the primary language of 
tuition at Stellenbosch University.  
 
The fourth threat to the Constitution comes from executive incapacity.  In many 
areas, the State appears to be incapable of effectively ensuring key rights because 
of the crisis that it is experiencing with service delivery. 
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The unhappy reality is that: 
 
 rampant violent crime too often deprives people of their right to life, their 
right to be free from all forms of violence, and their right to property; 
 the right to equality has been negated by the fact that after fifteen years, we 
are still one of the most unequal societies in the world – the State has not 
adopted appropriate legislative and other measures to protect and advance 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination;  the appropriate measures 
are not unbalanced affirmative action but decent education, effective 
service delivery and job creation; 
 the rights of children are not properly respected – as is illustrated by high 
levels of abuse and neglect, and the existence of so many street children 
and child-headed households 
 the right to basic education has been seriously limited by the failure to 
deliver decent education; and 
 too many people do not, in practice, enjoy adequate access to the courts or 
to a trial without unreasonable delay. 
 
The provision of effective education, policing and health services is an essential 
requirement for the achievement of constitutional rights. 
 
The fifth threat comes from the possibility that the Constitution might increasingly 
be interpreted by the courts to favour the executive or a single section of our society.  
I must stress that this has not yet happened.  The courts have on the whole given 
judgments that are independent and impartial.  The new Chief Justice has 
convincingly expressed his commitment to uphold the independence of the judiciary 
and of the Constitution. 
 
However, we cannot ignore the call by the ANC’s National Executive Committee in 
2005 to bring "the collective mindset of the judiciary" … "into consonance with the 
vision and aspirations of the millions who engaged in struggle to liberate our country 
from white minority domination".  Given this approach, the threat remains that the 
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executive might progressively try to ensure that like-minded judges are appointed to 
the bench.    
 
It is perfectly acceptable in South Africa – and in other countries with respected 
judicial traditions – that elected governments will and should ensure that the bench 
keeps pace with changing public values and attitudes.  However, there are limits to 
the permissible political evolution of the judiciary - particularly in multicultural 
societies like our own.   
 
The convention on which democracy rests is that questions of political power will not 
be settled by destructive and divisive conflict but through free and fair elections.  The 
indispensable corollary is that winners of elections must respect the civil and political 
rights of the losers.  This process must be regulated by constitutions and bills of 
rights, and must be adjudicated by fair and independent courts.  In effect, 
constitutions are written primarily to protect the interests of disempowered minorities 
and individuals – since majorities can usually use their control of state power to 
secure their own interests.  In the case of South Africa, it is particularly important that 
the political evolution of the judiciary not be permitted to undermine the carefully 
constructed constitutional consensus on which our new society was founded.   
 
Many constitutional rights are carefully balanced with countervailing rights.  There is 
a right to property – but there is also a right to land reform; there is freedom from 
discrimination – but there is also sanction for legislative and other measures to 
advance those who were disadvantaged through unfair discrimination.  There is a 
right to education in the language of one's choice – but it must be practicable, 
equitable and non-racial.  There is a right to use one's language and culture – but not 
in a manner that will undermine the rights of others.  Should the courts consistently 
deliver judgments in favour of just one side of the balance, the carefully constructed 
compromises at the heart of our constitution would be destroyed – and with them 
prospects for national unity and stability. 
 
The sixth threat to the Constitution comes from the prospect of political subversion.  
The lesson of the ANC's 52nd National Conference at Polokwane was that power, to 
its mind, does not reside in the Constitution or with Parliament, the executive and the 
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judiciary.  It rests, instead, according to the ANC left wing, in the hands of whichever 
group can gain control of the majority party in Parliament.  This is because Section 
47(3)(c) of the Constitution stipulates that members of Parliament lose their 
membership of Parliament if the party to which they belong rescinds their party 
membership.  Our parliamentary representatives are accordingly not primarily 
accountable to the electorate – but to the bosses of their respective parties. 
 
At Polokwane, the ability of factions opposed to President Mbeki to swing just 10% of 
the votes resulted in a complete shift in national political power.  The new party 
leadership – which had not been elected by the public – decided what the legislative 
programme of Parliament should be, dictated who should be appointed to key 
political posts and, ultimately, fired the President. 
 
Accordingly, it is just as important to observe the power relationships within the 
leadership of the ruling party as it is to watch the public display of party politics in the 
broader national arena.  In particular, we need to monitor the shifting relationships 
within the ANC/SACP/COSATU Alliance.  We should bear the following in mind: 
 
 COSATU subscribes to the SACP's political vision – so from a political 
point of view, it should really be the ANC/SACP Alliance.  Both the SACP 
and COSATU are committed to building "Marxism-Leninism as a tool of 
scientific inquiry to search for answers in the contemporary world". 
 COSATU and the SACP support the ANC's doctrine of the National 
Democratic Revolution – but only as a basis for further progress toward the 
achievement of their medium-term vision "to secure working class 
hegemony in the State in its diversity and in all other sites of power".  Their 
long-term vision is to build 'Socialism', that is, a fully-fledged Communist 
state. 
 The SACP has called for the "reconfiguration of the Alliance" by means of 
the establishment of an Alliance Political Council "to oversee broad political 
issues".  The ANC and COSATU would each have six members on the 
Council and the SACP, modestly, would have five. 
FW DE KLERK                       PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
 
11/204 
 The SACP had eighty members in the last Parliament who were elected on 
the ANC's list.  This was twenty per cent of total representation, despite the 
fact that opinion polls show that the SACP and COSATU combined would 
have no more than eight per cent of the vote.  Nevertheless, the SACP 
insists its members of Parliament who are elected on the ANC's list should 
continue to owe their primary loyalty to the SACP. 
 The SACP has abandoned the idea of standing separately in elections and 
has observed that "although elections are important, there is not a pre-
determined singular route for the working class to hegemonise power."  In 
other words, they plan to achieve power through other means. 
 At its Twelfth Congress in July 2007, the SACP quoted with approval the 
long-standing instruction of the Communist party of the Soviet Union that 
the SACP should concentrate on "developing systematically the leadership 
of the workers and the Communist Party in this organisation", that is the 
ANC. 
 
In the last few weeks, we have seen COSATU and the SACP launch a full frontal 
attack on Minister Trevor Manuel because they believe that his recently published 
Green Paper on National Strategic Planning10 presages a return to the broad 
economic policies of President Mbeki.  The outcome of this looming struggle will 
show where the centre of gravity in the ANC now lies. 
 
COSATU and the SACP are making no secret of their intention of seizing "working 
class hegemony in the State and in all centres of power" as the prelude to the 
establishment of a Marxist-Leninist state.  Needless to say, any such move would be 
a fatal blow – not only to our Constitution and our democracy, but also to our 
economy and to any prospect for peace and stability. 
 
The final threat to our Constitution is, perhaps, the most insidious of all.  It is our 
own apathy.  It is our unwillingness to support our Constitution actively, and to lay 
claim to the rights that it guarantees.  All of us continue with our daily lives;  we take 
our children to school;  we contribute to the economy in our offices and factories;  we 
                                       
10  September 2009. 
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entertain our friends;  and we go on holiday.  We seldom stop to think that virtually 
everything that we do, everything we own, everything to which we aspire, depends 
on the preservation of our Constitution and the freedom and rights that it guarantees.  
Somehow, we continue to regard the Constitution as something peripheral to our 
lives, something to which we need turn our thoughts only when the need arises. 
 
We must shed this attitude.  Our future happiness and prosperity and the future 
security of our children depends directly on the preservation of our Constitution.  It is 
not something that people can simply delegate to this or that political party, or this or 
that civil society organisation.  For evil to prosper, it is sufficient that good men 
should do nothing.   
 
I call on you all, in the months leading to the commemoration of the twentieth 
anniversary of 2 February 1990, to take active steps to support the Constitution.  
Know what your rights are; claim them and insist that the equally valid rights of all 
other South Africans be respected; support organisations like the Centre for 
Constitutional Rights that are upholding the Constitution;  make the Constitution a 
central part of your thoughts and of your lives – because, believe me, it really is.  
Support of the Constitution is not merely doing something for yet another good 
cause:  it is the most appropriate and pressing protection of one's own core interests 
of which I can think.  We are prepared to pay good money to insure our homes, our 
cars, our health and our lives.  What are we prepared to do to ensure our future 
freedom, peace and prosperity? 
 
Despite the warnings that I have given of the threats that confront our Constitution I 
remain an optimist.  I am confident that many people in the ANC leadership share 
many of the concerns that I have expressed this evening.  I am confident that the 
great majority of all our communities support the Constitution.  All of us now need to 
join hands in celebrating the many good things that we have achieved together since 
1990.  All of us, equally, need to work together to address the many serious 
challenges that still confront us. 
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